Presentation Information
[SY-104-03]Epistemological Perspectives on Delusion: Applying Tracking Theory to Delusions
*Senkei Ueno (Department of Psychiatry, Kyoto University Hospital(Japan))
Keywords:
knowledge,epistemology,justification
This presentation examines delusions from an epistemological perspective. Delusional beliefs often take the form of knowledge claims, but are typically dismissed for lacking epistemic justification. However, our empirical knowledge, which is ultimately based on common sense, similarly often lacks epistemic justification. We hold beliefs like "people around us are alive" or "the earth is round" without establishing their grounds by oneself. Thus, epistemic boundaries between delusional beliefs and ordinary knowledge claims are not clearly delineated.
To address this epistemological challenge, we apply tracking theory, an externalist approach. This theory suggests that knowledge depends not on epistemic justification but on whether beliefs appropriately track changes in circumstances. From this perspective, the incorrigibility of delusions, one of the hallmarks of delusional beliefs, can be interpreted as the fixity of belief across all counterfactual situations close to reality.
This framework offers advantages for both theoretical understanding and therapeutic intervention. If we adopt this framework in our clinical practice, we can avoid mutual blame regarding justification failures, and gain a practical method for examining the variability of potentially delusional beliefs through counterfactual scenarios.
Next, we examine the concept of cultural delusion within this framework. Cultural delusions persist as normal beliefs within their cultural contexts despite being deemed not valid by those outside the cultural framework. This indicates that the epistemic boundaries between culture-specific worldviews and clinical delusions can blur. We propose that the tracking theory approach—seeking intersections between patient and therapist reality concepts rather than imposing normative judgments—may offer an approach to dealing with the complex challenges of cultural delusions.
To address this epistemological challenge, we apply tracking theory, an externalist approach. This theory suggests that knowledge depends not on epistemic justification but on whether beliefs appropriately track changes in circumstances. From this perspective, the incorrigibility of delusions, one of the hallmarks of delusional beliefs, can be interpreted as the fixity of belief across all counterfactual situations close to reality.
This framework offers advantages for both theoretical understanding and therapeutic intervention. If we adopt this framework in our clinical practice, we can avoid mutual blame regarding justification failures, and gain a practical method for examining the variability of potentially delusional beliefs through counterfactual scenarios.
Next, we examine the concept of cultural delusion within this framework. Cultural delusions persist as normal beliefs within their cultural contexts despite being deemed not valid by those outside the cultural framework. This indicates that the epistemic boundaries between culture-specific worldviews and clinical delusions can blur. We propose that the tracking theory approach—seeking intersections between patient and therapist reality concepts rather than imposing normative judgments—may offer an approach to dealing with the complex challenges of cultural delusions.