Presentation Information
[2Yin-B-48]Weaker Notions of False-Name-Proofness in Deterministic Social Choice
〇Shota Miyamoto1, Taiki Todo1, Makoto Yokoo1 (1. Kyushu university)
Keywords:
Mechanism design,Game Theory,Social Choice
Analyzing the incentives of fake votes (also known as false-name manipulations) is a fundamental research challenge in multi-agent decision-makings. From the viewpoint of traditional dominant-strategy implementation, there exists no deterministic voting rule that is false-name-proof, i.e., completely resilient to fake votes with arbitrarily many fake identities, in general voting settings with more than two alternatives. In this paper, we weaken the requirement of false-name-proofness from two perspectives; (i) bounding the maximum number of fake identities and (ii) considering the non-obvious manipulability. Especially, we provide sufficient conditions for a parameterized class of voting rules, namely the positional scoring rules, to satisfy some weaker notions of false-name-proofness.