Presentation Information
[C17-01]Maintaining diverse social groups by integrating ingroup favoritism and generalized reciprocity
*Tatsuya Sasaki1, Satoshi Uchida2, Isamu Okada3, Hitoshi Yamamoto4, Yutaka Nakai5 (1. The Koriyama Women's College (Japan), 2. RINRI Institute (Japan), 3. Soka University (Japan), 4. Rissho University (Japan), 5. Kansai University (Japan))
Keywords:
Evolution of cooperaion,Evolutionary game theory,Social diversity,Ingroup favoritism,Generalized reciprocity
Human societies often maintain diversity on the sophisticated balance of competition and cooperation, even among strangers. Despite that, traditional models of the evolution of cooperation often overlook diverse social groups that coexist. To address the issue regarding the evolution of social diversity, here, we present a novel approach integrating different classical mechanisms for cooperation: ingroup favoritism and generalized reciprocity, which have often been studied in isolation. We set up the model in terms of evolutionary game theory and analytically and numerically investigate it. Our study reveals that stable polymorphism of individuals with different social tags is maintained even in well-mixed populations. It also turns out that the diversity achieved can withstand the presence of complexity costs.