Presentation Information
[SS19-04]Evolution of coordinated cooperation through kinship
*Hisashi Ohtsuki1, Nadiah P. Kristensen2, Ryan A. Chisholm2 (1. SOKENDAI (Japan), 2. National University of Singapore (Singapore))
Keywords:
cooperation,evolution,kinship
Coordinated cooperation, which means that people agree on who will pay the cost of cooperation before the interaction, can be an effective device to maximize the efficiency of collective action. Such joint cooperation requires commitment by individuals to honestly fulfill their predesignated actions, and several experiments show that human participants are indeed able to perform this goal. However, an evolutionary question arises as to how the honesty is guaranteed. It is easily expected that a Liar strategy, who agrees to pay the cost but deceptively fails to do so, could invade the population of honest cooperators. Here we hypothesize that the ancestral environment of humans, where relatedness within a group had been relatively high, could explain the origin of coordinated cooperation by modern humans. To theoretically explore this possibility, we have first invented a new analytical machinery to study evolutionary dynamics of multi-strategy games with kin. We propose generalization of relatedness coefficients to any number of individuals and show that a certain payoff-transformation enables us to study games with relatives in a computationally tractable manner. Using this methodology, we show the condition under which coordinated cooperation persists even after the level of relatedness declines from the ancestral one.